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EMERGING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW AND
TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW-CONGRUENCE OR
CLEAVAGE?
Edward Kwakwa*
One of the most significant developments in contemporary in-
ternational economic relations has been the proliferation of a com-
plex network of arrangements and undertakings for the benefit of
the lesser developed countries. These arrangements range from
declarations and final acts adopted at international conferences to
more solemn obligations binding on various combinations of states
and other international legal persons.
I A. MUTHARIKA, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT ix (1978)
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary purposes of the United Nations (UN) is to
achieve "international cooperation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character."' Thus,
in the past four decades, the international community, led by the
developing nations, has sought to remedy existing problems of un-
derdevelopment.
The emergence of politically independent developing countries in
the post-war era has had a discernible impact on the present state
of international law. The attainment of political independence by
these countries brought into focus the economic disparities in the
international system and the accompanying issue of "economic self-
determination." A clamor has arisen for a more equitable inter-
national economic system2 to adequately reflect the needs and as-
pirations of the developing countries.
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I U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
2 See M. BULAJIC, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW (1986).
"The struggle for the establishment of the New International Economic Order
represents a continuation of the process of decolonization in the economic sphere,
the negation of domination and of neo-colonialism in international economic
relations." Id. at 15.
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Gradually, a new discipline in contemporary international law
referred to as "international development law" emerged. This article
focuses on the legal status of emerging issues in international de-
velopment law as a means of understanding the conceptual frame-
work within which it is written. The concept is distinguished from
other related terms such as "the right to development" and "The
New International Economic Order". A brief historical exegesis of
the international law of development is given, along with a discussion
of its normative content, focusing primarily on treaties and other
written instruments, state practice, judicial and juristic opinion, as
well as the practice of intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations.
The article takes the position that although international devel-
opment law is a new and emerging area of international law, its
sources can be derived from the traditional formulation stipulated
in article 38, paragraph 1 of the statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). The article stresses that international development
law is necessitated by the increasing interdependence of states in
international relations. Further, the emerging issues in international
development law are in the interest of the entire international com-
munity, including developed as well as developing countries. As a
result, international development law has a salutary effect on world
order and basic human dignity and should therefore be actively
promoted by the community of states. In conclusion this article
recommends methods for enhancing the significance and importance
of international development law.
A. Clarification of Terms
"International development law" refers to the law regulating the
relations among sovereign but economically unequal states. It is
"the international law of the modern era of the development of
mankind." ' The "law of development" must be distinguished from
the "right to development. ' 4 Whereas the former generally refers,
3 Id. at 49.
4 The "right to development" is a concept of very recent origin, generally
traced to an address given to the Institut International de Droits de l'Homme, in
1972 by Mr. Keba M'Baye, First President of the Supreme Court of Senegal. See
M'Baye, The Right to Development as a Human Right, 5 REVUE DES DROITs DE
L'HOMME 503 (1972).
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights formally recognized the human right
to development in 1977. See U.N. Doc E/CN.4/ SR.1389, 1392-98 (1977). For an
extensive discussion of the human right to development see, e.g., Espiell, The
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inter alia, to the myriad international instruments constituting the
corpus of the subject of development, the latter could be said to
be a branch, albeit a significant aspect of the law of development.5
The concept of a right to development, for which there is no precise
legal foundation, has evolved rapidly with a minimum of interna-
tional scrutiny. 6 The law of development, however, refers to a body
of principles and rules formed within the international legal system
with the aim of promoting development.
The international law of development is the emerging legal struc-
ture of the proposed New International Economic Order (NIEO). 7
This law of development is the principal means through which
attempts are being made to achieve a NIEO. It is an instrument
for the economic and legal transformation of international relations
whose basic aim is to promote equity' and to compensate the de-
veloping countries for their disadvantaged positon vis-a-vis devel-
oped countries.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT AS A NEW
DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The concept of the law of development as a new discipline in
contemporary international law can be traced to the writings of the
Right to Development as a Human Right, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 189 (1981): Mestdagh,
The Right to Development, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 30 (1981); Verwey, The New
International Economic Order and the Realization of the Right to Development
and Welfare - A Legal Study. 21 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Symposium,
Development as an Emerging Human Right, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 429 (1985).
The right to development is often referred to as one of the two basic elements
of the international law of development (the other being the duties and respon-
sibilities involved in the system of international cooperation for development). See
F. GARCIA-AMADOR, II THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 630-31
(1984).
6 See, Final Report of UNESCO Expert Meeting on Human Rights, Human
Needs and the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UNESCO
Doc. SS/8/CoNF. 630/12 at 90-93 (1978).
7 Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New
Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1980). The NIEO is a concept on which much has been
written. See generally, Verwey supra note 4, at 1; Akinsanya and Davies, Third
World Quest for a New International Economic Order, 39 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 101 (1983). P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? (1987).
8 Equity has been referred to as "the basic principle of international devel-
opment law" because "it serves to resolve the contradictions between simultaneous
demands for economic independence and for organized mutual aid, for equality
in preferential treatment, for common benefit and the renunciation of reciprocity
on the part of developing countries." M. BULAJIC, supra note 2, at 50.
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late Professor Friedmann. 9 Friedmann described the law of inter-
national economic development 10 as a body of law which must
concern itself not only with the minimum principles adequate for
the legal protection for foreign investment, but also with the prin-
ciples protecting national control of natural resources, as well as
with matters pertaining to the policies, methods and structures of
international financing of economic development.l"
In 1965 Professor Michel Virally referred to the law of devel-
opment as a new area of international law. 12 Thereafter, the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations prepared a survey of
international law in response to a request by the International Law
Commission of the UN.' 3 The survey stressed that international law
was expanding:
from a body of law imposing negative restraints on independent
sovereign states, to a body of law which, in recognition of con-
ditions of increasing interdependence imposes on states various
positive obligations of a procedural and substantive kind. The law,
9 See Friedmann, The Changing Dimensions of International Law, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 1147 (1962).
1o The term "economic development" was used interchangeably with "devel-
opment" and "growth" in the period preceding the early 60's. See ECOSOC
Commission on Human Rights: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/SR 1334 at 7 (1979) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report]. Recent emphasis
has, however, been on a far broader concept of development, particularly as it
relates to the social aspects of development. The Brandt Commission for example,
states that "development is more than the passage from rich to poor, from a
traditional rural economy to a sophisticated urban one. It carries with it not only
the idea of economic betterment, but also of greater human dignity, security,
justice and equity." NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 49 (1980).
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has defined development as:
A comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process which
aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population
and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits re-
sulting therefrom.
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group of Govern-
mental Experts on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. E/EN.4/1985/I 1, Annex
4 at 2 (1985).
In this article, for purposes of brevity and clarity in analysis, only the economic
aspects of development will be discussed.
See Friedmann, supra note 9, at 1165.
See Virally, Vers un Droit International de Development, 9 ANNUAIRE FRAN-
C AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7 (1965).




in other words, is coming to be seen as concerned not only with
the protection of the independence of states, but also with the
duty to cooperate in the promotion of national and human wel-
fare. 14
It also described the law relating to economic development as:
an emerging body of law as part of, and a complement to, the
objective stated in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter of
promoting "social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom" and the purposes of the Organization mentioned in
paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Charter, namely "to achieve in-
ternational cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.""
Professor Schachter gave prominence to the concept of interna-
tional development law in his article The Evolving International
Law of Development. 6 He identified two broad categories of the
corpus of international development law: first, the complicated net-
work of international undertakings and arrangements concerned with
aid, trade, investment, and the like for the benefit of the less
developed countries17 ; and second, "the resolutions, declarations,
charters of rights and duties, standards and final acts which seem
to proliferate in international organizations and conferences.' ' 8 In
effect, the evolving international law of development is to to be
derived, inter alia, from the practice of states, treaties and judicial
opinion.
14 Id. at 35.
"1 Id. at 34-35.
61 Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976).
17 Id. As Schachter explains, these undertakings involve a great variety of
relationships, including those that are bilateral, regional, or global. Id.
11 Id. at 3. According to Prof. Schachter, the central feature of the contemporary
international law of development is:
the idea of need as a basis for entitlement .... The present rationale
for international assistance and preferential treatment on the basis of need
is more in keeping with the premises of the welfare state - that is, to
provide for the minimal human needs of the most disadvantaged segments
of society ... thus there is increased acceptance of the idea that specially
disadvantaged countries such as landlocked states or former colonial ter-
ritories or states dependent on a single commodity have special needs that
entitle them to preferential treatment.
Id. at 10.
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III. THE NORMATIVE CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT. LAW
International development law is a compendious term for several
new but interrelated principles in international law. Its precise scope,
content and substance are still emerging. A review, however, of the
texts of bilateral and multilateral agreements, UN declarations and
resolutions, as well as an examination of the practice of major
development actors reveals that specific norms have crystallized. The
most important of these include:
1. The duty of states to cooperate for global welfare.
2. The principle of preferential treatment for developing coun-
tries.
3. The principle of entitlement of developing countries to need-
based development assistance.
A. The Duty of States to Cooperate for Global Welfare
The duty of cooperation is derived largely from the UN Charter,
article 1, paragraph 3 which states that one of the main purposes
of the UN is '"to achieve international cooperation in solving in-
ternational problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humani-
tarian character." This objective is specified more precisely in article
55 of the Charter, 9 and all members have pledged, under article
56, "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article
55 .'20
Scores of General Assembly resolutions and declarations pertain-
ing to the economic and social progress of the developing countries,
to the establishment of the NIEO, and to the strategies for the UN
Development Decades reiterate the duty of states to cooperate for
global welfare. Prominent among these is the 1970 Declaration on
19 Art. 55 provides that the U.N. shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and,
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
20 Arts. 55 and 56 have been described as "the most significant provisions of
the United Nations Charter." See I. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 182 (1983).
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Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States2' (hereinafter Declaration on Friendly
Relations). Others include the Declaration and Program on the
Establishment of a NIEO, 22 which states that international coop-
eration for development is the shared goal and common duty of all
countries; the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; 23
and the 1980 resolution on an International Development Strategy
for the Third UN Development Decade.2
The UN Charter and these numerous General Assembly resolutions
and declarations are often the basis for an assertion of the existence
of a duty to cooperate for global welfare at the international level.
The debate of the 37th session of the UN Commission on Human
Rights, for example, stressed that "action to promote development
[was] a legal obligation of the international community, and in
particular of the industrialized countries. ' 25 Several textwriters have
elaborated on this duty as an established principle of international
law. 26 The moral and philosophical underpinnings of this duty of
cooperation for global welfare are discussed below.
21 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
22 Resolution 3201 contains the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (VI Special), U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 3; U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) [here-
inafter Declaration]. Resolution 3202 contains the Program of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (VI
Special), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No..1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in
13 I.L.M. 720 (1974).
23 G.A. Res. 1281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). Some say the Charter creates relatively
few firm obligations, since so much of the Charter is diluted by the use of "should,"
considerable significance accrues by default to those passages that create firmer
obligations and rights, and that even though the language adopted mandates action,
the nature of that action is left almost comletely to the discretion of individual
States. The obligation, it is said, is firm, but not very tangible it is therefore
unlikely that this Charter provision would motivate States to alter their behavior.
See Gamble & Frankowska, International Law's Response to the New International
Economic Order: An Overview, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. R. 257, 274 (1986); cf.
note 51, infra.
24 U.N. Doc. A/Res/35/56 (1980) reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 480 (1980).
23 See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 10, at 45.
26 See e.g. Verwey, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that the most obvious secondary
principle of the NIEO is that of the duty of all states to cooperate for the welfare
of all, in particular the duty of the developed states to assist the developing states
in the course of development); Lachs, The Development and General Trends of
International Law in Our Time, 169 (IV) RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 96-100 (1980)
1987],
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
B. The Principle of Preferential Treatment for Developing
Countries
The principle of preferential treatment for developing countries27
is based on the idea that unequals should be treated unequally in
order to obtain an equitable application of the principle of equality. 28
It thus introduces legal inequality or "positive discrimination ' 29 in
international economic relations to the benefit of developing coun-
tries, and:
aims at correcting the inequitable effects of the traditional twin
liberal principles of freedom and legal equity-which, in a society
in which the economically weak have to compete with the eco-
nomically powerful on an equal footing, tend to favor the latter.
As one of the most conspicuous legal offsprings of the fundamental
of "solidarity," it constitues a cornerstone of what the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States refers to as "collective
economic security for development." 30
The norms of equal and non-discriminatory treatment in the relations
of states (based on the international economic system founded after
the Second World War) came under increasing attack in the early
(the numerous General Assembly resolutions give an unequivocal interpretation of
Arts. 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, and therefore cannot be viewed as being
without legal effect. Formulae such as "to promote general welfare throughout
the world" and "to cooperate in the promotion of economic growth throughout
the world" constitute an important guide for drawing conclusions on the state of
the law on the subject); M. BULAJIC, supra note 2, at 290.
27 Discussions concerning the principle's implementation give rise to the problem
of defining a developing country. The most convenient and least problematic
criterion would be a resort to UN documentation and statistics for identification
of the class of developing countries.
28 The distinction between equity and equality, although sometimes difficult to
discern, is important in this context. "Equality" suggests possession of the same
rights, privileges, duties, etc. Here, however, there is economic inequality between
developing and developed countries. The argument, therefore, is that an application
of equitable (i.e. just; existing in equity; available or sustainable in equity, or
upon the rules and principles of equity - BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (5th ed.
1984)) principles will secure greater economic equality.
Compare remarks by Mr. Tammes in a discussion by the International Law
Commission (ILC) on the most favored-nation clause. See 1 Y.B. INT'L LAW
COMM'N 208 (1986) (stating that differential treatment of developing states was
"reminiscent of the Aristotelean definition of equality as requiring that the unequal
should be treated unequally.")
29 Phrase respectfully borrowed from Verwey, The Principle of Preferential
Treatment for Developing Countries, 23 INDIAN. J. INT'L L. 343 (1983).
30 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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60's. One of the strongest attacks came from the first Secretary-
General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD), Raul Prebisch, when he asserted that "no
matter how valid the principle of the most favored nation may be
in trade relations among equals, it is not an acceptable and adequate
concept for trade among countries with highly unequal economic
power." 3 UNCTAD subsequently called for "the early establishment
of a mutually acceptable system of generalized non-reciprocal and
non-discriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to devel-
oping countries." '3 2 The claim to preferential treatment has since
been extended to fields other than trade. Article 19 of the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, for example, explicitly
states:
With a view to accelerating the economic growth of developing
countries and bridging the economic gap between developed and
developing countries, developed countries should grant generalized
preferential non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to
developing countries in those fields of international economic co-
operation where it may be feasible.33
Similar provisions can be found in the Lima Declaration and Plan
of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation,3 4 General
Assembly Resolution 3362 (5-VII) on Development and International
Economic Cooperation, 3 the Development Strategy for the Third
31 Cited in Espiell, GA TT: Accomodating Generalized Preferences, 8 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 341, 345 (1974).
32 U.N. Final Act and Report of UNCTAD II, Annex I (E/CONF. 46/141). The
Generalized Preferences (GP) system has been described as "the most important
practical application up to date of the principle of differential treatment." Yusuf,
Differential Treatment As a Dimension of the Right to Development, in HAGUE
WORKSHOP, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 233, 234
(1979) [hereinafter HAGUE WORKSHOP 1979].
3 G.A. Res. 1281 supra note 23, at art. 19 (1975). It should be noted that
preferential treatment is not limited to tariff preferences but is also sought in all
fields of international economic cooperation where it is feasible. It is also recognized
in the areas of transfer of technology (Art. 13), and cooperation in the economic,
social, cultural, scientific and technological fields (Art. 9).
34 U.N. Doc. A/10112 (1975) reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 826 (1975) [hereinafter
Lima Declaration]. The plan of action suggests a series of special measures for
building up the necessary economic and social infrastructure in the least developed,
land-locked and island developing countries; the redeployment of certain productive
capacities to the developing countries; and an expansion of the Generalized System
of Preferences.
35 G.A. Res. 3362, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. I, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1975).
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United Nations Development Decade,36 and in the 1982 UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea." The status and legal significance
of the principle enshrined in these documents is more extensively
discussed below. 38
C. The Principle of Entitlement of Development to Need-Based
Development Assistance
The principle of entitlement is aimed at bridging the disparities
in international economic relations. This "new conception of in-
ternational entitlement to aid and preferences based on need," 3 9 as
suggested earlier, is a central feature of the international law of
development. It is expressed "in many of the agreements relating
to trade preferences, investment, and resources; in the bilateral and
multilateral programs of aid; and in the broad normative resolutions
adopted by the United Nations bodies on commodities, relocation
of industry, the oceans, international liquidity, and numerous related
matters. "40
Thus, the International Development Association, for example,
was created in 1960 for the purpose of accelerating the economic
For the text of the resolution, see 14 I.L.M. 1524 (1974). The resolution calls for
inter alia: preferential access for the developing countries to the domestic markets
of the developed countries; favorable and concessional terms on all loans and
credit extended to the developing countries; and development and transfer of
technologies appropriate to furthering the growth of developing countries. See id.
36 Reprinted in 5 A. MUTHARIKA, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT 17.
37 U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.62/122, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). The provisions
on preferential treatment of developing countries are found in different sections
of the Convention. Particularly instructive are Article 148 ("The effective partic-
ipation of developing states in activities in the Area shall be promoted ... having
due regard to their special interests and needs, and in particular to the special
need of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged . . ."); Article 144 (pro-
grams for transfer of technology to developing states with regard to activities in
the Area and for providing opportunities to personnel from the developing states
for training in marine science and technology and for their full participation in
activities in the Area); Article 150 (Policies relating to activities in the Area shall
be carried out in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the world
economy and balanced growth of international trade, and to promote international
cooperation for the over all development of all countries, especially developing
states). Id.
38 See also Dorsey, Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for International
Economic Relations, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 109 (1977).




development of less developed countries. 4' International financial
institutions like the World Bank were also set up with the specific
purpose of encouraging "the development of productive facilities
and resources in less developed countries. '42
In light of these documents, some argue the entitlement to in-
ternational development assistance:
has become integrated in the thinking and practice of States on
both sides of the process, because they all deem it right and they
deem it obligatory; it has effectively passed into the reality of
international custom and forms part and parcel of customary in-
ternational practice which constitutes one of the sources of inter-
national law. 43
As a result of the consistent and widespread response to the special
problems of developing countries, some suggest customary inter-
national law already recognizes developing countries as a special
category of subjects." The merits of these claims, as well as of the
principle of entitlement of developing countries to need-based de-
velopment assistance, are discussed below.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
Having outlined the normative content of international develop-
ment law, this section analyzes the probative value of the previously
mentioned sources. It establishes that the sources of international
development law are in pari materia with the traditional sources of
international law, as stipulated in article 38 of the I.C.J. statute.
International develoment law is also derived from extra-legal, albeit
equally valid, sources of contemporary international law.
A. International Conventions and Instruments
As mentioned previously, the normative content of international
development law is derived in large measure from the UN Charter.
4 Agreement of the International Development Association (IDA), Jan. 26,
1960, 11 U.S.T. 224, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 394 U.N.T.S. 221.
42 Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(I.B.R.D.) Dec. 27, 1945, art. 1, para. 1, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 1943, T.I.A.S. No.
5929, at 2; U.N.T.S. 134.
41 HAGUE WORKSHOP 1979, supra note 32, at 97.
44 See e.g., Verwey, The Recognition of the Developing Countreis As Special
Subjects of International law Beyond the Sphere of United Nations Resolutions,
id., at 372; cf. Mestdagh, The Right to Development, 28 NETH. INT'L REv. 30,
36-37 (1981) (arguing against recognition of developing countries as a special
category of subjects in international law, since that would entail "creating not
only two kinds of subjects of the law, but also two kinds of law.")
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Some argue, however, these provisions of the Charter do not create
any legal obligations on the part of member states, and since they
are formulated in general non-specific wording, they are "mean-
ingless and redundant."4 This argument has a very superficial the-
oretical appeal, however, article 56 of the Charter clearly obligates
a state to do something towards the achievement of the purposes
set forth in article 55. This implies a right to do nothing does not
exist. 6 A teleological interpretation of the Charter requires that its
provisions be regarded as legally binding on member states, partic-
ularly in light of Charter provisions that "express clearly the ob-
ligations of all members. . . . [Wihile the provisions are general,
nevertheless they have the force of postive international law and
create basic duties." ' 47 Political and juridical organs of the UN have
also interpreted the provisions of articles 55 and 56 as constituting
legal obligations. 4 The preferable view, therefore, is that these
Charter provisions establish firm commitments in the form of a
binding treaty obligation. 49
This conclusion fails to solve the problem of obligation because
the UN Charter does not specify in detail what kind of action the
member states are expected to take. Article 13(1) of the Charter,
however, calls upon the General Assembly to "initiate studies and
make recommendations for the purpose of: a) . . . encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification."
Thus, several pertinent UN resolutions and declarations have clar-
ified the substantive principles of international development law.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
for example, clearly requires:
[Elach State Party to the present Covenant [to undertake] steps,
indirectly and through international assistance and cooperation
41 H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 99 (1951) ("Art. 56 is one of
the most obscure provisions of the Charter," [and] does not impose any obligation
upon the members.... Legally, article 56 is meaningless and redundant.")
46 Verwey, supra note 4, at 21. To be sure, the claims of the developing countries
are simply for the operation of law as in certain constitutional systems by way
of affirmative action and reverse discrimination to secure equal opportunity.
41 Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 131 (1977).
In support of this view, see also L. GOODRICH, J. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 370-82 (1969).
4' I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC. INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (1973).
49 Some textwriters have insisted that the U.N. Charter should be regarded as
a Constitution or Charter, rather than a treaty. For our purposes here, however,
by whatever designation the Charter is referred to, this does not detract from the
legal force of its provisions.
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especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressiyely the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means including in particular the adoption of legislative measures.s °
At least 70 states are party to this Covenant, and their treaty
obligation therefore imposes a legal duty5 on them. This is consistent
with the fundamental precept of international law that agreements
are binding on the parties and must be performed by them in good
faith (pacta sunt servanda). The principle has been so universally
applied that it suffices merely to state it.52
50 Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316, (1966) (emphasis added).
Admittedly the Covenant is somewhat nebulous concerning the exact nature
of the obligations it seeks to create. For example, it raises the question of what
a country's maximum available resources are. Does it mean the United States, for
instance, in signing the Covenant, was cognizant of the possibility of subjecting
its defense budget or allocation of its domestic resources to third party review?
The question, thus framed, must be answered in the negative. The Covenant also
leaves unanswered what are all appropriate means.
11 The legal duty may exist notwithstanding the lack of specificity of the kind
of obligation involved. Broad generalization and imprecise formulation, as in this
Covenant are often considered too indefinite to support the intention of creating
legal obligations. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. The legal implications
of the UN Charter, for example, together with other constitutional instruments,
though formulated in broad general terms, have not been seriously disputed and
are generally considered binding. See Chowdhury, Legal Status of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 79, 81 (Hossain, ed. 1980).
Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State
is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty it has signed, even if the treaty is not yet in force. In deciding the exact
nature of the legal obligations devolving on states, courts should therefore consider
the object and purpose of the Covenant which, ex hyposthesi, is the promotion
of international development. The domestic law analogue to this interpretation of
legal obligation is what the French refer to as "obligations de resultat," rather
than mere "obligations de moyen"-i.e., obligations which guarantee the attain-
ment of certain results, so that the mere fact of the non-materialization of the
result constitutes a violation of the obligation, rather than an obligation of mere
performance which leaves discretion to the subject on whom the duty is imposed.
The ICSID award of Klockner v. Cameroon, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 145 (1984), elaborated
on this concept of "obligation of result." The difficulty with this argument,
however, is that the degree to which the desired result will be attained rests
significantly more with the developing countries themselves, depending on how
they utilize the development assistance granted them. Moreover, most of the
developing countries simply do not have the means of guaranteeing the results for
their citizens.
52 On the "strategic nature" of this cardinal principle in the law of treaties,
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The Declaration on Friendly Relations serves as a further ex-
ample. 3 This authoritative declaration was unanimously adopted
with the full participation and consent of all the member states.14
In effect, the consensus on its adoption55 conforms to the discernible
"trend from consent to consensus as the basis of international legal
obligations.' 56
The legal status of international development law is contingent
on the significance attached to UN resolutions and declarations.17
see T. ELIAS, NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1979). The Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adds that the international cooperation is
based on free consent. See Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 supra note 50, at art. 11,
para. 1. As later discussed, however, this free consent has been abundantly man-
ifested in the practice of states.
13 See supra, note 21. See also the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
which "has passed into the mainstream of contemporary international law guiding
national as well as international constitutions and action." See T. ELIAS, supra
note 20, at 214. The Declaration is now regarded as a part of the "law of the
United Nations." I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (1981).
14 See Declaration on Principles of International law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028,
at 21 (1970), reprinted in, BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (1980).
Perhaps the obligation to grant assistance arises out of the system of the UN
itself. The UN could assert a claim on behalf of the developing countries, against
developed countries, for international development assistance. The developed coun-
tries could meet this obligation bilaterally as well as unilaterally.
11 The question as to what substantive content of the declaration brought about
this consensus is answered by a perusal of the declaration. It specifically mentions,
among others, the principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the Charter and that all States have a duty
to cooperate. Thus, if the United States refused to pay its share of UN assessment
which would otherwise have been used to channel aid to the third world, it could
plausibly be argued that the United States had not acted in good faith nor adhered
to the duty to cooperate for international welfare. Admittedly, a difficult question
remains concerning the exact standards or criteria used in assessing whether coun-
tries adhere to this obligation. It is suggested that a purposive and contextual
interpretation on a case-by-case basis would illuminate the decision-making process.
56 Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM.
J. INT'L L. 782, 785 (1966).
The United States Supreme Court also relied on the notion of consensus in
assessing the reality of an international legal obligation. In Banco Nationale de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Court held that international law
rules imposing a duty upon an expropriating government to pay an alien "prompt,
adequate and effective" compensation were no longer supported by a consensus
of sovereign states, and therefore the validity of those rules were so ambiguous
as to make them inapplicable to the case.
17 This conclusion is a result of the bulk of the corpus of international law
incorporated and codified primarily in Assembly resolutions and declarations.
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Several respected textwriters take the view that these resolutions and
declarations do not have any legally binding force." Admittedly,
such resolutions are not a formal source of law within the for-
mulation of article 38(1) of the Statute of the I.C.J. Under the UN
Charter, the Assembly does not have the legal competence to legislate
or to adopt legally binding decisions except those regarding certain
organizational matters such as regulations for the Secretariat and
other procedural rules. There is indeed a vast amount of literature
on this age-old question.5 9 A review of such literature is, however,
beyond the scope of this article. Despite their formally non-binding
character "even within the conservative framework of article 38 of
the statute, legal effect may be given to the collective pronounce-
ments of the General Assembly." 60 Indeed in a sense, these reso-
lutions reflect state practice. 6' State practice, as is generally known,
is identical with custom, which undoubtedly plays an important role
within the framework of the UN. 62 For this discussion, it is instruc-
tive to note the former President of the I.C.J. has recognized three
of the declarations giving substantive content to international de-
velopment law as examples of law-making resolutions and decla-
rations of the General Assembly. 63
58 See e.g., Jenks, The Scope of International Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1954); Onu, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General
Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349-55 (1970); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure
of the International court of Justice 1951-54; Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence
and Procedure 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1958).
19 See generally, Ill 0. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (1985); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIF-
ICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1966); Jennings, Recent Developments in the International Law Commission: Its
Relation to Sources of International Law 13 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 385 (1964).
- Schachter, supra note 16, at 5. General Assembly resolutions have had a
formative influence on the development of international law, and are now regarded
as expressions of common interest and the "general will" of the international
community. 0. SCHACHTER, supra note 59, at 111.
61 R. HIGGINS, supra note 59, at 2-5. "International custom is to be deduced
from the practice of states, which includes their international dealings as manifested
by their diplomatic actions and public pronouncements .... [T]he body of reso-
lutions as a whole, taken as indications of a general customary law, undoubtedly
provide a rich source of evidence." Id.
62 For a long-standing debate on a legitimate interpretation of state practice or
custom, see Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1 (1974-75), and D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International
Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982).
63 These three declarations are:
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The numerous resolutions and authoritative declarations of the
UN and other international conventions adopted by the world com-
munity clarify and elaborate principles of international law. These
developments have given rise to rules of law which are in a stage
of approximation to customary international law.
B. International Custom
Customary practice is a dependable guide for ascertaining the
continuing scope and meaning of commitments reduced to writing
in treaties and international agreements, and "[since] it is based
upon collaborative behavior, it is most likely to be representative
of the common interests of the community." 64 The creation of
international development law came about in large part through the
process of claims and counter-claims made by states. As a matter
of daily practice, international law is largely concerned with claims,
"but the claims themselves, although they may articulate a legal
norm, cannot constitute the material component of custom. ' '65 It
thus remains to be seen whether the claims are manifested in the
actual practice of states.
The practice of providing development assistance to developing
countries through a program known as Official Development
Assistance66 points to the recognition of the substantive inequality
1. Resolution on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States;
2. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States;
3. The United Nations Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
See I. ELIAS, supra note 20, at 213-14.
64 Raman, Toward a General Theory of International Customary Law, in To-
WARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 365, 366 (Reisman & Weston eds.
1976).
65 A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971), part
thereof reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 42, 44 (1980).
66 Development assistance is one of the primary means through which capital
is sent to the developing countries. It represents approximately a third of all
external capital receipts by developing countries. ORGANIZATON FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION; EFFORTS AND POL-
ICIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, 1982 OECO
REVIEW, 51, 53 (1982).
Development assistance, which is intended to be a means for poorer countries
to better their quality of life, has often failed to achieve its basic goals because
of serious environmental and social disruption caused by intended and unintended
effects of these activities. See Muldoon, The International Law of Ecodevelopment;




among states. The Generalized Preference System (GPS), under
which developed countries grant preferential and non-reciprocal
treatment for developing countries, is also generally followed. Since
March 1972, UNCTAD, in collaboration with UNDP, has provided
technical cooperation on the GPS adopted by UNCTAD in 1970.
This preferential tariff system provides advantages to developing
countries by enabling qualified products to enter markets of pref-
erence giving countries at reduced or totally eliminated most favored
nation rates of duty. The GPS is designed to raise the levels of
developing countries' foreign exchange earnings, rates of industri-
alization, and levels of economic development. 67
Another example is the Lome Conventions establishing a com-
pensatory financing machinery called STABEX. 61 STABEX provides
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States with the right to
be compensated by the European Community for shortfalls in export
earnings from specified primary products, under certain circum-
stances, and up to certain limits. The importance of these treaties
is clear, since "they obligate a large number of states to concrete
NIEO-relevant conduct; the obligations are both firm and tangi-
ble.,, 69
State Practice shows that the differential treatment of developing
countries is recognized and accepted by the international community
and is applied by the developed countries in their relations with
developing countries. Some object, however, that this treatment does
not establish international custom. The developed states may have
several motives for granting development assistance but do not act
out of a legal conviction. In addition, it is argued, the lack of
opinio juris70 detracts from its essence as custom. The difficulty
67 UNCTAD BULLETIN No. 230, at 14 (March 1987).
66 The EEC and the ACP States have entered into three Lome Conventions.
Lome I entered into force in 1975 reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 595-642 (1975); followed
by Lome II in 1980 reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 341-77 (1980) and Lome III in 1985
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 571-642 (1985).
69 Gamble & Frankowska, International Law's Response to The New Interna-
tional Economic Order: An Overview, 9 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 274
(1986).
For detailed accounts of State Practice see Verwey, The Principle of Pref-
erential Treatment for Developing Countries, 23 INDIAN. J. INT'L L. 343 (1983);
Perrott, EEC Attitudes and Responses to The New International Economic Order,
3 ST. Louis U. PUB. L..F. 115 (1984).
70 Though some legal commentators have minimized the importance of opiniojuris, the World Court has .categorically insisted upon this requirement of a psy-
chological element. See, e.g., The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at
28; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at para. 77.
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with the opinio juris requirement is that the first States to adopt a
new practice are regarded as acting on the basis that the practice
is obligatory before it has become obligatory. 7' Additionally, "sub-
jectivities are only ascertainable to an onlooker through overt be-
havior and one necessarily relies on conduct to infer the perception
of others."7 2 State practice on the matter is specific; it has been
constant and consistent, so that what started as a mere habit has
gradually but inevitably hardened into a general practice based on
the conviction that it is required. 73
C. Other Traditional and Non-Traditional Arguments for
International Development Law
Some argue a moral duty of reparation devolves upon the de-
veloped countries because underdevelopment is basically the sequel
of colonial domination. 74 As a result, documents like the Declaration
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order posit
"the right of all states, territories and peoples under foreign oc-
cupation, alien and colonial domination to restitution and full com-
7, Kelsen, for example, accepts opinio juris in theory, but observes that it can
only be inferred from conduct. Thus, the conduct, and not the state of mind, is
legally decisive. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 564 (1966).
72 Id.; cf. Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J.
INT'L L. 300, 313 (1968) ("But it would be misleading to conclude that this implied
the elimination of a psychological test. It is one thing to use conduct as an indicator
of opinio juris; it is another - and quite a different process - to evaluate conduct
independently of opinio juris".)
71 Even a constant, consistent, and uniform nature of State Practice does not
necessarily establish custom. This is particularly true since States like the United
States, although they give development assistance and the like, have consistently
denied that they are under a legal obligation to do so. Specific practice, however,
could lead one to infer a certain degree of opinio juris. It could be argued that
the developed countries involved grant development assistance because they deem
it right to do so. This may not necessarily imply opinio juris, but it does not
detract from the psychological element involved. See also, 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING
THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 8 (1977). Schacter states:
[Wihat is striking is not so much its espousal by the large majority of
poor and handicapped countries but that the governments on the other
side, to whom the demands for resources are addregsed, have also by and
large agreed that need is a legitimate and sufficient ground for preferential
distribution. This agreement is evidenced not only by their concurrence
in many international resolutions and by their own policy statements, but
also, more convincingly, by a continuing series of actions to grant assis-
tance and preferences to those countries in need.
Id.
7, See Secretary General's Report, supra note 10.
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pensation for . . . exploitation and depletion.""7 This proposed
reasoning, however, is not in accordance with State Practice. To so
argue Would be to argue that developed countries which were not
former colonial masters would not be under a duty to grant any
development assistance. 76 The developed countries do not grant as-
sistance because they need to account for colonial exploitation.
Additionally, in practice developed countries do not limit devel-
opment assistance exclusively to former colonies. The constitutive
documents, referred to previously, mention the duty of co-operation
for the welfare of all nations not just for that of former colonies.
Other commentators suggest charity may be one of the reasons
why the developed countries are under an obligation to grant de-
veloping countries development assistance. Charity, however, de-
notes an element of volition or generosity rather than a compulsion
to act. The pejorative connotations attached to the word charity
are obvious. Furthermore, developing countries themselves might be
reluctant to accept assistance on that basis.
77
Principles of equity and justice are more solid bases for inter-
national development law. 78 Recent trends in world social process
79
suggest that principles of equity and justice are increasingly invoked
in international law. The linkage of justice and the development
process came about when the UN General Assembly stressed that
global economic development should be established "on the basis
71 See Declaration, supra note 22, at para. 4(f).
76 It could, however, be plausibly argued that countries like the United States
even if not colonial masters, benefitted immensely from the system of colonization
through the resources of their allies and other dependent territories. According to
this argument, the developed countries owe a duty to the developing countries.
This duty is a result of the system of colonization and its impact.
11 See HAGUE WORKSHOP 1979, supra note 32, at 98.
78 Admittedly, these are not traditional sources of law in the I.C.J. statute,
which is generally accepted as constituting a list of the sources of international
law. See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1984).
The argument could however be made that "equity" and "justice" are "general
principles of law" recognized by civilized nations. In addition, paragraph 2 of
article 38 permits the I.C.J. to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree
thereto. And in any case, there are other sources which are not easily discoverable
in the text of article 38. See Schachter, supra note 72, 300-322 (1968).
19 "World social process" is a compendious term used to indicate that the
expanding circles of interaction among men extend to the remotest inhabitants of
the globe (i.e. world), and that the active participants of the interaction (i.e.
process) are living beings (i.e. social). See M. McDouGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES
IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 10 (1987).
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of justice, equality and mutual benefit." 80 The notion of justice
elevates the satisfaction of the developing countries' needs to that
of an entitlement, thus transforming the relationship between donor
and recipient into one of "mutual rights and responsibilities."',
The need for equity in international law is not derived exclusively
from moral idealism. In order to remain effective, international law
must change to conform to the sociological structure of the inter-
national community. The interdependence of developed and devel-
oping countries makes the economic well being of each nation a
matter of concern for all. The emergence of international devel-
opment law should therefore be regarded as a trend in the mutual
interests of the North as well as the South.12 The increasing reliance
of the North on the South for trade and resources, and the concern
surrounding an already precarious international economic order,
exacerbated by the worsening problems of the developing countries,
reflects these interests.
The law not only reflects the prevailing state of affairs, it also
serves as an instrument for achieving what is required.8 3 Regardless
of the criteria used to ascertain international law the result must
reflect the contemporary expectations of the majority of the com-
munity. As long as it seeks to set legal standards, international law
must reflect a consensus of the values and opinions of an inclusive
community. This naturally leads to considerations of law and equity
in the relations between states.
The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case8 4 elaborated on the impor-
tance of justice and equity. In this case, the I.C.J. regarded the
go Preparation for an Internaitonal Development Strategy for the Third United
Nations Development Decade, G.A. Res. 33/193, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at
121, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979). The terms "justice" and "equality" are not
necessarily coterminous. Equality is defined as "the condition of possessing sub-
stantially the same rights, privileges and immunities, and being liable to substantially
the same duties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 481 (5th ed. 1984). This is certainly
a far cry from the kind of equity or justice being sought by international devel-
opment law. The concept of "mutual benefit" is also difficult to understand in
this context, in light of claims for almost exclusive benefits to the developing
countries. It can however be understood in the sense that the attainment of a new
international economic order would be to the mutual benefit of all parties involved.
0 . SCHACHTER, supra note 73, at 9 (1977).
82 See Lachs, supra note 26, at 95 ("The enlightened long-term self-interest of
the developed countries lies in the reduction of this material gap between 'North'
and 'South'.")
83 M. BULAJIC, supra note 2, at 43.
4 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 8 (Dec. 18, 1951).
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economic interests and geographic position of Norway as "very
distinctive," thus necessitating special treatment, stating "such a
coast, viewed as a whole calls for the application of a different
method. Nor can one characterize as exceptions to the rule the very
many derogations which would be necessitated by such a rugged
coast. The rule would disappear under the exceptions." 85 The court
concluded the method of straight baselines established in the Nor-
wegian system, although contrary to the accepted standard at the
time, "was imposed by the peculiar geography of the Norwegian
coast." ' 86 The case suggests that international law can, and indeed
must be used to rectify inherent inequalities between states.8 7 Since
some of the peculiar problems of the developing countries are the
result of nature's work, some argue that it is not for international
law to change geography or "completely refashion nature. '8 The
converse, however, is equally true; it certainly is not the function
of international law to re-emphasize or exacerbate the inequality
already existing. International development law seeks to mitigate or
rectify existing inequalities, and this is a compelling reason why it
should be given juridical status. 9
Historically, international judicial opinion employed criteria such
as a sense of rightness, necessity, reason, natural law, humanitarian
values and the will of the international community. 90 Thus, the
11 Id. at 128-29.
86 Id. at 139.
87 For a critique of this position see Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Cases, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 114 (1951).
88 Concerning The Continental Shelf (Libya & Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 36 (July 27,
1984).
89 See also Lachs, supra note 26, at 94-95 (arguing that law can be an important
tool in assisting poorer people raise their standard of living, in preventing the rich
from becoming richer at the expense of the poor, and in serving as an instrument
of progress and for the betterment of international relations).
See e.g. Concerning Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 4 (July
27, 1984) ("the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice
but justice according to the rule of law . . .even though it looks with particularity
to the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it looks beyond it to principles
of more general application"); South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. 250-324
(Tanaka, J. Dissenting) (finding the rule against apartheid constituted a general
principle of law, not necessarily within the formulation of article 38(1) of the
I.C.J. statute, but for the simple reason that it was a jus naturale, "valid through
all kinds of human societies", and derived from the concept of "man as a person.");
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1969 I.C.J. 49 (although all states are equal
before the law and are entitled to equal treatment, "equity does not necessarily
imply equality."); Reservations to the Conventions on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (application
of "humanitarian" values.)
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moral and philosophical underpinnings of international development
law are not at variance with the case law. For example, in Concerning
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya),9' the court stressed that
in the application of equitable principles, the fairness of the result
was more important than the principle to be applied in reaching
that result. The court stated:
The result of the application of equitable principles must be
equitable. This terminology, which is generally used, is not entirely
satisfactory because it employs the term equitable to characterize
both the result to be achieved and the means to be applied to
reach the result. It is, however, the result which is predominant;
the principles are subordinate to the goal. The equitableness of a
principle must be assessed in the light of its usefulness for the
purpose of arriving at an equitable result. It is not every such
principle which is in itself equitable: it may acquire this quality
by reference to the equitableness of the solution.92
Applying this statement to the field of international development
law suggests the principles discussed above derive their legal validity
from the equitableness of the solution they seek to obtain. It further
suggests developing countries are entitled to claim international de-
velopment assistance as of right if that would result in a more
equitable international system. The claims being made for a new
international economic order have therefore received tacit judicial
recognition. a3
Emerging international development law is increasingly receiving
attention from jurists. Since the writings of publicists are a source
9, Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 24).
92 Id. at para. 70 (emphasis added). Although this statement was used in relation
to applicable principles and rules for the delimitation of the Continental Shelf
area appertaining to Libya and Tunisia, it is a fair inference that the invocation
of equitable principles would apply a fortiori to the area of international devel-
opment law.
91 Note that several international instruments expressly refer to equity. Article
59 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, for example, states that conflicts
between the interests of the Coastal State and any other State in the exclusive
economic zone "should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all
the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the
interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a
whole." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982; see
also The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, G.A. Res. 2320, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/68 at art.
11, para. 7; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/
27 (1969) at art. 44, para. 3(c), reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 875 (1969).
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of international law, the more the authorities refer to the legal
validity of international development law, the more authoritative
the concept will be. The desirability of this conclusion is borne out
by the significance of the subject.
V. SIGNIFICANCE AND USEFULNESS OF INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT LAW
International development law is important for a number of rea-
sons. The first is the extent to which it will enhance the aspirations
of developing countries which form the bulk of the international
community. The developing countries view international law sus-
piciously because the status quo engendered within its application
is to their disadvantage. 94 International development law responds
to the major goal of eliminating existing inequalities in international
economic relations and therefore serves to make international law
more relevant to developing countries benefiting the international
community at large.
The implications for international peace and security resulting
from a recognition of international development law are obvious.
International peace and security are related to, and cannot exist
independently of, international development. Thus, in Resolution
3176 (XXVIII), the General Assembly clearly stated that interna-
tional peace and security are necessary conditions for the social and
economic progress of all countries.95 Economic inequality is a de-
stabilizing factor in the orderly conduct of inter-state relations. There
is no dispute that Third World countries have frequently violated
94 See generally I. ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1972); Anand, Attitude of the Afro-Asian States Towards Certain Problems of
International Law, 15 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 55 (1966).
11 It is noteworthy that the maintenance of peace, the achievement of devel-
opment and the promotion of respect for human rights are the central objectives
of the UN, as stated in the charter. The relationship between peace and security,
on the one hand, and development, on the other hand, is also manifest in the
effect that disarmament has on development. In the Draft Declaration on the
Right to Development, experts from France and the Netherlands stressed that
"there exists a close relationship between disarmament and development; that
progress in the field of disarmament would considerably promote progress in the
field of development." Question of the Realization in all Countries of the Economic
Social, and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and Study of Special Problems which the Developing Countries Face in
Their Efforts to Achieve these Rights. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/11, Annex III,
at 1.
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existing rules of international law96 out of a desire to rectify what
they regard as economic inequities in the international system. Stud-
ies also conclusively establish that problems of growing economic
crises frequently lead to the toppling of moderate or democratically
elected regimes by radical, and often dictatorial regimes. 97 The con-
tinuation of this trend is certainly not conducive to the maintenance
of a minimum world order. Thus, international development law
which aims at improving the economic situation in the Third World
could also serve to enhance the maintenance of world order.
The ultimate purpose of development is to lay the basis for
realizing human dignity. Recent trends in world social process point
out an increased emphasis on the concept of basic human dignity.
This concern for the advancement of human rights is here to stay,
out of necessity as well as idealism. Since international development
law is aimed, inter alia, at upholding the concept of human dignity
it is therefore a firm indication of its importance and usefulness as
a normative order. 98
VI. APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION
International development law is an emerging branch of inter-
national law. It represents the beginning of a conscious effort to
face the inescapable fact of global interdependence. 99
96 Noteworthy examples are expropriation of alien property without prompt,
adequate and effective compensation; the unilateral rescheduling or declaration of
an inability to pay debts as a result of unfavorable balance of payments, etc.
91 There is also a direct correlation between the level of poverty and the incidence
of violence in any particular society. See also, Secretary General's Report, supra
note 10, at 76 (there can be no lasting peace if populations are beset by poverty
or suffering from malnutrition and sickness,or there is continued inequality among
nations and a "persistence of international injustice in regard to the distribution
of resources.")
91 Also instructive is a proposal by the expert from the United States, on the
Draft Declaration on the Right to Development, E/CN.4/1985/I1, Annex VI, at
2 ("efforts to promote and protect human rights at the international level should
be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international economic order.")
9 The former Vice-President of the World Bank, William Clark, in his book
Cataclysm - The North-South Conflict of 1987, argues about aspects of inter-
dependence other than the familiar trading linkages. He shows that technological
progress has made modern societies extremely vulnerable, and that militant groups
in any part of the world can command sufficient know-how to penetrate and
disorganize complex systems in a way that can wreak massive disruption in other
parts. It is also the thesis of his book, that ecological damage can spill over
national boundaries and endanger global systems that support life everywhere.
These are very instructive statements, particularly when they emanate from a former
Vice-President of the World Bank. See W. Clark, Catalysm - The North-South
Conflict of 1987 (1987).
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW
This article has shown that the principles on which international
development law is based are largely found in international treaties,
UN resolutions and declarations, as well as in the practice of States.
The relevant norms and principles are directly dependent on the
character of the political and economic trends of development. This
results from the dialectic relationship between the economic infra-
structure of the international system and its legal superstructure.
International development law can make its mark only if its
benefits are perceived as universal, and its costs do not exceed its
benefits. It spite of the degree of sacrifice required of the developed
countries, in the long run this sacrifice should inure to the benefit
of the developed countries as well as the developing countries.
Effective adherence to principles of international development law
will require sufficient political will and support nationally as well
as internationally. The concept of State sovereignty, which seems
to be prima facie in conflict with international development law,
must be reviewed. States must accept restrictions on the exercise of
their sovereign rights in external as well as internal economic pol-
icies. ' 00 This requires the implementation of more effective regulatory
mechanisms by international development agencies and other actors
in the international arena.
In conclusion, it must be stressed that concern for international
development is necessary for the continued functioning of the in-
ternational system. Questions pertaining to international develop-
ment law will therefore remain the most intensely debated in the
next decade and will produce discernible effects on the evolution
of substantive rules of international law as well as on the inter-
national decision-making process.
The developing countries, for example, would have to be accountable for the
international development assistance they received.
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